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INTRODUCTION

Section 18 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 provides

that nothing in the Act shall prevent any state agency or court from asserting
jurisdiction over occupational safety or health where no standard is in effect
under the federal law.' In addition, a state may reassume responsibility for
occupational safety and health where federal standards are applicable by submitting a comprehensive plan for the development and enforcement of its own
standards. 2 This plan will be approved by the Secretary of Labor if it meets
a series of requirements designed to assure that the state plan is or will be
as effective as the federal program. 3 In spite of some protestations to the contrary, 4 section 18 thus makes it clear that Congress intended the states to have
a major, if not an exclusive, role in job safety and health matters.
But why would Congress return authority to the states regarding occupational
safety and health? Everyone connected with promoting the 1970 legislation agrees
that it was the failure of the great majority of states to adequately protect working
men and women that created the need for the federal government to act in
the first place. 5 If that was the case, why would Congress clearly seek to maintain
a predominant role for the states in this program? The failure of all past federal
programs for job safety must have played a major part in the decision. For
some Congressmen, the question of states' rights was also significant. Those
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1 0cc. Safety & Health Act § 18(a), 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1970).
2Id. § 18(b), 29 U.S.C. § 667(b).
3Id. § 18(c), 29 U.S.C. § 667(c). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1902 (1973). Mr.JohnJ. Sheehan, Legislative
Director, United States Steelworkers of America, would interpret this language to mean only that
a state with an approved plan must "evolve in effectiveness consonant with future growth in the
federal program." Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 23, 1974). This interpretation not only misconstrues explicit statutory
language, but is contrary to the obvious congressional intent to allow states to improve upon their
programs as they existed at the time the Act was passed. The grant provisions of section 23 also
support the concept of initial developmental plans. Occ. Safety & Health Act § 23, 29 U.S.C. §
672 (1970). In addition, the Secretary's regulations carry out this congressional intent in that they
provide for the development and continuation of a state's "at least as effective as" program. 29
C.F.R. §8 1902, 1952-54 (1973). An interpretation such as Mr. Sheehan's would have completely
foreclosed any states from participating in state plans-a result which was clearly not intended
by Congress.
4
See Brief for Plaintiff at 5, AFL-CIO v. Brennan, Civil No. 74-406 (D.D.C., filed March 11,
1974). See also Remarks by John J. Sheehan, Legislative Director, United States Steelworkers of
America, in Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 23, 1974).
' See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D
CONG., 1ST SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970,
at 144 (Comm. Print 1971).
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members believed that the closer any government function was to the people
it serves, the better that form of government. For other Congressmen, it was
a question of manpower. 6 It was certain when the law was passed in 1970 that
it would be some time before the U. S. Department of Labor could hire replacements or transfer the nearly 2,000 state inspectors that were in the field. Congress
simply was not prepared to disenfranchise all of these individuals without a
clear plan by the federal government for replacing them. The opponents of
any state programs have stated that if the activities of these state inspectors
were terminated, the federal Department of Labor would be forced to hire
replacements or to accept the transfer of displaced state inspectors. 7 This naive
proposal ignores the congressional track record on prior federal safety programs.
It also is blind to the niggardly personnel commitments thus far established
for both the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). s Finally, there
was the question of cost. Congress desired neither that the states, especially
the large industrial states, discontinue spending millions of dollars on job safety
and health nor that federal funds replace those state expenditures.
I
CRITICS AND ADVOCATES OF STATE JURISDICTION

The question of whether state agencies should be the sole or primary governmental unit charged with the promulgation of standards and their enforcement
under the Act evokes extremely varied responses from differing interest groups.
Ralph Nader, environmentalists, and other "public interest" organizations would
say that states could not be trusted to administer such a program. These spokesmen are suspicious of state government and maintain that all programs designed
to achieve social change are best administered by a strong central government.
They believe that state administrators are parochial and that state legislatures
are archaic. The governors, on the other hand, believe the states should do
the job. In fact, only five governors have yet to submit a proposal for state
takeover of responsibility under the Act 9-and there is some indication that
even these states may participate in the OSHA program in the future. 10
The U. S. Department of Labor, through its Secretary and its Assistant Secretary in charge of occupational safety and health, has been a strong supporter
of state programs. While it is clear that this is top-level policy within the Department, there are some career employees at the lower levels who demonstrate
sSee id. at 159, 161, 861-62.
" See Statement by John J. Sheehan, Legislative Director, United States Steelworkers of America,
before a Subcomm. on State Programs of the National Advisory Committee for Occupational Safety
and Health (NACOSH), in OFFICIAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 43-44 (Sept. 23, 1972).
1 See, e.g., PRESwENT'S BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL 1974 (1973), wherein authorization for
only 800 OSHA compliance officers for the entire country was sought.
9
The following jurisdictions have not submitted plans: Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, and
South Dakota. 3 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 848-49 (1973).
10 See id. Four states-Georgia, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania-have withdrawn previously submitted state plans. However, substantial support for state plans remains in
Georgia, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. Id.
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a lack of enthusiasm for state programs. Nevertheless, the official federal position
continues to be encouragement for effective state programs in spite of strong
and persistent criticism. 1 In addition, thebusiness community across the United
States appears to favor state plans, though there has been a cooling of enthusiasm
in large interstate firms in recent months. Some steel and chemical firms and
a few of the larger international building contractors have voiced outright opposi-

tion to state plans. However, smaller firms, intrastate operations, local chambers
of commerce, and business in general still support administration by state governments.
Many-unions oppose state plans.1 2 They fear that the state government will
be soft toward business because strict local enforcement could result in closures
and loss of jobs within the state. They believe they have a much better chance
of gaining their goals for true safety and health on the job through Congress
and the U. S. Department of Labor than they do in the fifty states. While
the international unions and their Washington lobbyists have been unswerving
in their opposition to state plans, local union leaders and state labor councils
have passively and at times actively supported effective state plans, sometimes
13
even aiding legislative efforts to pass such plans in state legislatures.
II
CRITICISMS OF STATE PLANS

The critics of state safety programs and the federal Department of Labor's
encouragement of state plans under the Act allege that the states have never
done a good job in safety, that state standards are inadequate, that state inspectors
are unqualified and too few in number, and that state safety programs are
dominated by management.' 4 Further, it is said that the states have been granted
too much leeway under the guidelines and indices of effectiveness promulgated
by the U. S. Department of Labor. It is feared that these "loose" guidelines
will erode the Occupational Safety and Health Act and that the hard-won gains
in the U. S. Congress will be lost under weak state programs. It is also asserted
that encouragement of the states to submit and operate under "development
plans"15 has allowed them to receive federal funds and to retain authority to
enforce standards before reaching levels of effectiveness actually equivalent to
those of the federal program. The critics declare that plans should not have
been approved in this way because the states are tendering only "paper promises"
11See Address by John Stender, Assistant Secretary of Labor, before the Montana State Legislature, Jan. 17, 1974, in id.at 1034-35.
12Remarks by I.W. Abel, President, United States Steelworkers of America, Frank E. Fitzsimmons,
President, Teamsters Union, Floyd E. Smith, President, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace. Workers, March 15, 1973, in 2 id.at 1183-84. See also Industrial Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO, Coalition Position Against New York Program: Spotlight on Health and Safety (1st Quarter
1974).
13
See 3 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 849 (1973). Compare Michigan with Pennsylvania.
14See Statement by George Taylor, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, Member, National
Advisory Committee for Occupational Safety and Health, before a Subcomm. on State Programs
of NACOSH, in OFFICIAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 56-80 (Mar. 15, 1973).
15See 29 C.F.R. § 1902.2(b) (1973).
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for needed legislation, staffing, and standards.1i Finally, it is said, state plans
should not be encouraged because a state legislature can always refuse to appropriate money and thus scuttle the program for that state. They could also earmark
money or "line item" appropriations
in a way that would frustrate the goals
7
and objectives of the Act.1
While the foregoing list of charges against state programs is not exhaustive,
it is representative and each claim should be examined. It is true that the
states have not done a good job in safety, but the federal government has not
performed as well as many states. How can anyone advocate the federal
government as the sole cure-all in the field of job safety when the best it has
done for years is to equal many states in poor performance? For example,
the federal government has had the reponsibility for safety in longshoring for
more than a dozen years.' Though there has been steady, slow improvement
in the safety record of this industry, it continues to be one of the highest
hazard occupations in our country.' 9 Moreover, within the federal government there are a number of departments with accident records worse than those
found in private industry.20 This poor federal record in safety has been created
and perpetuated under both Democratic and Republican administrations,
so it has no particular partisan sponsorship.
The charge that state standards are inadequate is ridiculous in light of the
21
fact that the bulk of the federal standards are "national consensus standards
22
which have been adopted pursuant to section 6(a) of the Act. Many, if not
most, of the states have adopted verbatim or utilized national consensus standards
as sources for their own standards. Indeed, OSHA has often been criticized
for the application of its standards because of the confusion it has caused. OSHA
has also been rebuffed by the courts when it has attempted to modify its stan24
dards 23 or create new ones.
There is simply no solid evidence to support a charge that state standards
have been inadequate, especially when one compares OSHA's track record in
the standards arena. Admittedly, some state programs in the past have not
included all of the hazards covered by OSHA standards. But not even the state
eSee note 14 supra.
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Id.

1s
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act § 41,33 U.S.C.

§ 941 (1970), formerly
ch. 509, § 41, 44 Stat. 1444 (1927). Section 941 of the Act was passed in 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-742,
72 Stat. 835 (1958).
19 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, FINAL ESTIMATES OF JOB-RELATED

INJURIES
AND ILLNESSES IN 1972 (1974).
2
0Hearings on H.R. 843, H.R. 3809, H.R. 4294, H.R. 13373, Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor
of the
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 363 (1969).
21
See Occ. Safety & Health Act § 3(9), 29 U.S.C. § 652(9) (1970).
22 Section 6(a) of the Act authorized the Secretary to promulgate by merely publication in the
Federal Register, "national consensus standards" for a period of up to two years of the effective
date of the Act. Id. § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a). The first sets of such national consensus standards
were promulgated by the Secretary and published in the Federal Register on October 18, 1972.
See 37 Fed. Reg. 22,102-356 (1972).
23 See Associated Indus. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973), which
vacated the Secretary's modified sanitation standard.
24 See Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Labor, 489 F,2d 120 (5th Cir.
1974), wherein the court stayed the effect of the Secretary's emergency temporary pesticides standard.
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plan provisions of the Act require states to cover all hazards. 25 States are free
to choose which hazards they wish to cover; when a state decides not to occupy
federal standards continue to apply, despite the existence
a particular area,
26
of a state plan.

Another charge that cannot be substantiated is that state inspectors are
incompetent or uniformly management oriented. The fact is that labor departments in large industrial states are filled with highly qualified personnel guided
by both Republican and Democratic administrations. The pay for state occupational safety personnel in New York and California is often higher than corresponding federal compensation. Federal studies have shown state health inspec27
tors have job entrance requirements comparable to their federal counterparts.
National union leaders have recently charged that the federal guidelines
for state plans allow the states too much leeway, thus jeopardizing the hard-won
gains of organized labor. 28 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

was clearly a compromise for which many Congressmen would not have voted
without the provisions that encourage and strengthen state participation in safety
programs. 29 Many state labor commissioners believe that national labor leaders
are defaulting on that compromise by their across-the-board opposition to state
plans. It seems that they are trying to achieve administratively what they could
not achieve in the legislature. If Congress had wanted every state plan to duplicate
the applicable federal provisions, it could easily have said so. Instead, Congress
provided a list of eight major points that must be met by a state in order for
it to gain plan approval.30 Thus, it can be effectively argued that any "leeway"
allowed by federal guidelines properly implements federal intent,3 since the
federal regulations require inclusion of the eight points, and more. '
Another major point of critics is that states should not be allowed to operate
32
under "developmental" plans because they are filled with "paper promises.
Any government plan in its inception is a "paper promise," including the federal
plans for OSHA and NIOSH. If a state plan were not approved under section
18(b) until state legislation, standards, procedures, and personnel were all up
to the final levels contemplated for OSHA, then we would have no state plans
yet approved. With the federal government so far from its own internal targets,
it seems blatantly inconsistent of the critics of state plans to charge states with
failing to meet a theoretical goal of what should be when the law requires only
that a state propose a plan that is or will be as effective as the federal program.
It seems equally inconsistent for the critics to speak of federal inadequacies
in one breath and then to clamor for exclusive federal jurisdiction in the next.33
250cc. Safety & Health Act § 18(b), 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1970). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1902.2(c)

(1973).
26

1d.

27

See Comments by Richard Wilson, Deputy Director, State and Federal Programs, before

NACOSH,
in Transcript of Official Proceedings (Dec. 6, 1973).
2

' See note 4 supra.

29

See Address by John Stender, supra note 11.

30 See Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 18(c)(1)-(8), 29 U.S.C. §§ 667(c)(1)-(8) (1970). See also 29

C.F.R. §§ 1901, 1902, 1952.1-.8 (1970); 38 Fed. Reg. 24,361-64 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 1837-39

(1974).

See 29 C.F.R. § 1902 (1973).
31
32
See notes 4 & 14 supra.
"' See note 4 supra.

750

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Finally, the critics have pointed out that state legislatures could refuse to
appropriate money for state safety programs. This is absolutely true, but Congress
could also refuse to appropriate money for federal safety programs. Indeed,
Congress has in very recent years demonstrated its unwillingness to appropriate
adequate funds for safety programs. In 1972, the labor movement was able
to secure an additional $10 million from the Senate for the U. S. Department
of Labor's OSHA program, only to have the House of Representatives greatly
reduce the appropriation. 34 That action clearly refutes any argument that federal
appropriations for OSHA are certain and state funding doubtful.
If the approximately $200 million now expended by the states is enlarged
to anticipate the higher outlays necessary under the Act and then added to
(1) the money that will always be necessary for a separate federal administration
in those states that will not have an occupational safety and health program
and (2) the federal monitoring costs required when a state does retain safety
responsibility, the hugh outlay of funds necessary under the administration's
current policies can be seen. Then it must be obvious that state monetary participation is necessary in order to maintain the existing level of the overall occupational safety and health program effort. If the states that are already effective
in occupational safety are encouraged to continue their participation, the federal
obligation in these jurisdictions is, in effect, reduced by half. Existing administration policy allows participating states to retain their compliance officers, their
safety training staff, the office administrators, and the technicians that are currently employed. These are the very types of personnel the federal agency
is finding difficult to recruit or retain. Present policy thus also eliminates the
three or four years the federal government would need (assuming congressional
support) to gear up to existing levels of state performance in these areas. Any
hiatus in the enforcement effort would be a high price to pay to satisfy
Washington-based lobbyists willing to buy centralization at any cost.

III
THE POSITIVE SIDE OF STATE PLANS

Initially, all but three of the states-New Mexico, Ohio, and South
Dakota-participated under section 18(h) of the Act, 35 continuing to enforce
their laws concurrently with the federal government in 1971 and 1972. By mid1974, state plans had been approved for twenty-fivejurisdictions: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Six jurisdictions have never formally submitted requests
"

118

CONG.

REc. H 7080-81 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1972).

35 Under section 18(h) of the Act, states were permitted to enter into agreements with the
federal government which allowed them to continue enforcement activities pending the Secretary
of Labor's derision on the states' developmental plan. The statutory authority for such agreements
expired on December 29, 1972. Thus, if the Secretary took no action within two years of the
date of enactment to approve a plan, the state's law was preempted. Occ. Safety & Health Act
§ 18(h), 29 U.S.C. § 667(h) (1970). See note 39 infra.
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for approval: Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and the trust
territories. Five states-Georgia, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and
Pennsylvania-originally submitted plans but have subsequently withdrawn
them. Hence, twenty plans are still under consideration, including those of several
states, territories, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 36 These plans are
pending before the Assistant Secretary of Labor, awaiting his determination
37
as to whether they meet the test of section 18 of the Act and his regulations.
A. The Washington State Plan
In the State of Washington, the state legislature displayed unusual bipartisan
responsibility and unanimously gave its state department of labor a complete
mandate to proceed with administration of a state law that is, in the eyes of
many, more effective than the federal law. Washington has achieved such a
degree of development in enforcement in the less than two years that have
passed since achieving OSHA approval that some of the federal employees of
that state have been reassigned to other states, where there is no comparable
state activity. The only compliance complaints now handled by the federal personnel in the State of Washington are those concerning the state's administration
of the program. The workplaces of more than two-thirds of the state's employees
have been inspected in one year. More than 15,000 inspections discovered more
than 48,000 violations and resulted in nearly $132,000 in fines. Washington
was able to achieve this high level of job safety and health administration so
promptly because it had 60 years of experience, a staff of 113, a budget of
$1.5 million, a sophisticated law on the books, and a good working relationship
with management and labor in the state.
B. The Iowa State Plan
There was a very small-scale job safety and health program in Iowa before
1970. In 1971, the state government worked closely with a state college in developing its plan, submitting it early in the summer of 1972. The Iowa legislature
promptly passed legislation that apparently met the criteria of the federal
guidelines. However, it was different from the federal Act in some respects
and OSHA questioned the wisdom of some of the variations.3 8 Prior to federal
approval, Iowa had hired new inspectors who were already out enforcing the
new, stronger state laws and assessing fines when appropriate. Their enforcement
efforts were suspended in 1972, when a federal court ruled that the provision
of the federal Act which permitted two years of joint federal and state enforcement could not be administratively extended.3 9 It was not until June of 1973
36 Data supplied by the Office of Federal and State Operations, OSHA, update as of June,
1974 (on file with the author).
37 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 18, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1970). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1902 (1973).
38 3 CCC EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE § 8856.
39 See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 2 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 867 (D.D.C.,
Jan. 2, 1973) (order granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of extension). The Secretary
had attempted to extend the life of section 18(h) by regulation, 37 Fed. Reg. 25,711-12 (1972),
which was withdrawn subsequent to the court's ruling and subsequent to a denial by the court
of appeals of a motion to stay the preliminary injunction. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also

note 35 supra.
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that Iowa was again able to enforce its laws and to continue developing its
safety program. Iowa's administration of occupational safety and health programs has had as dramatic an impact as that in Washington. The response
and results achieved in Iowa show what a smaller state can do if it exercises
all the opportunities extended to a state under the federal Act.
C. The Michigan State Program Versus the Federal
Program in Ohio
A comparison might be helpful in illustrating the positive elements in state
plans. Unlike Michigan, Ohio has never chosen to enter a state plan under
section 18(b). Michigan's governor has been an enthusiastic supporter of state
programs. Ohio has four federal area offices in major cities and those offices
occasionally borrow compliance officers from Michigan and other neighboring
states to handle compliance matters. The number of compliance officers in
Ohio in 1971 and 1972 never exceeded 30, though recent transfers and hires
have more than doubled this number. In Michigan the state agencies have had
almost 100 health, construction, and general job safety inspectors in the field
since 1970. 4 0 There have also been approximately a dozen federal officers based
in Detroit to serve the entire state. Though somewhat smaller in worker population than Ohio and somewhat less industrialized because of its larger rural area
in the north, Michigan has thus had more than three times the number of
compliance officers regularly inspecting workplaces.
In recruiting these inspectors, Michigan has a strong attraction for its own
qualified citizens because they often need not relocate. These local inspectors
possess knowledge of local conditions and problems as well as practical job experience. Many also have roots in the local labor movement or industry.
Michigan's qualifications for an entrance job in safety inspection places great
emphasis on actual job experience, in addition to academic achievement and
test scores. This approach is designed to encourage qualified applications from
those who have been active in the occupational safety and health movement
within organized labor or management, from minority groups, and from qualified women.
In addition to knowledgeable local inspectors, a state plan offers community
leaders the opportunity to participate in a program meaningful to their constituents. Under Michigan's state plan, both labor and management have a much
greater role, legally and practically, in the rulemaking and policy-making aspects
of the program than they do at the federal level. Indeed, some of Michigan's
state standards should achieve greater effectiveness than federal standards
because of the contributions of the tripartite industry committees which have
edited, clarified, and enlarged federal standards, while maintaining "as effective
as" basic requirements. Michigan's reporting and statistical program is also more
comprehensive than the federal program.
Another advantage of state programs is the potential for alternative
approaches for achieving compliance provided by other state laws, such as work40

See

MICHIGAN DEP'T OF LABOR, 1973 ANNUAL REPORT

PUBLIC HEALTH, 1974 PROGRAM PLAN

241, 247 (1974).

72, 80 (1974);

MICHIGAN DEP'T OF
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men's compensation benefit penalties or the prohibition of the employment
of minors when an employer's operation is shown to be unsafe. A high accident
rate could also result in an increase in inspections by the state as a further
deterrent to unsafe conditions. No such program currently exists under OSHA.
A greater emphasis on safety education and training in the state program will
help workers and management become more conscious of their rights and duties
under the law. These approaches can all provide a more effective means of
achieving safety than OSHA has yet provided.
While international union spokesmen currently oppose all state plans, 41 initially they indicated the elements of a state plan which had to be present before
organized labor could give its encouragement to a state plan or legislation. Those
requirements were (1) worker participation in a body comparable to the national
advisory committee, (2) employee observation of monitoring exposure to toxic
materials, (3) protection for complainants whose names would be withheld from
employers upon request, (4) prohibition against advance notice of the inspection,
(5) the right of employees or their representatives to accompany inspectors
during their "walk around," (6) written inspection reports following the compliance officer's tour, and (7) placing these health and safety responsibilities
in a state agency whose other functions do not conflict with the protection
of workers.
Michigan's state plan will meet all these criteria. The legislation passed by
the Michigan legislature in May, 1974, will provide more than $4 million to
support nearly 200 field personnel in one of the nation's most ambitious job
safety and health programs. Some of the innovations in inspection scheduling,
employer training programs, and health hazard abatement programs might
never have been instituted had not this state program been implemented.
IV
INNOVATIONS AND PROBLEMS

A. State Program Innovations
While most state legislation mirrors the federal law, the federal government
has wisely allowed some room for innovation in each of the plans it has approved.

It should be obvious that what is a necessary and proper occupational safety
or health standard for Florida may be an inappropriate and weak standard for
Michigan. National standards often represent a floor or common denominator

that is less than what we should settle for in a northern, industrial and/or highly
unionized state. Even though the Act calls for only an equivalency in effectiveness

for a state plan, the citizens in individual states may demand something more
in certain safety and health areas. Under state plans, the individual states are

free to improve upon standards promulgated by OSHA in order to maximize
workplace safety and health. Some states are in the process of promulgating
more effective standards now.

In some states a degree of controlled consultation is allowed, though it is
41 See note 4 supra.
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largely prohibited for federal personnel. Advisory committees also play a far
more important role in standards promulgation in some jurisdictions than at
the federal level. Often a greater emphasis on training, education, and attitudinal
changes is provided by the states than one finds in the federal scheme.
Other states have used techniques to establish the priority for inspections
different from the federal government's "target industries" and "target health
hazards" approach. In addition, some states have created specialists within their
inspection forces so that some inspectors inspect construction projects, others
conduct general industry inspections, and still others inspect for occupational
health purposes. These innovations, combined with the modern and uniform
reporting techniques instituted under OSHA, will for the first time allow a
basis for comparison as to how best our nation can eliminate hazards and reduce
accidents on the job.
B. Outstanding Problems in State Administration
Some states remain weak in the field of industrial hygiene. A few are fortunate
in having an aggressive and modern state health department with an admirable
record of concern for occupational safety and health. One outstanding example
is New York, where the whole occupational health administration is effectively
merged with the state department of labor. But in many states the health department still is struggling to develop adequate competence in administering and
enforcing an occupational health program. Often small state departments of
health do not have the time or strength to involve themselves in job health
matters. The federal government must do as much as it can to encourage a
prompt and adequate growth of state health inspection capabilities.
A second outstanding problem is that of differing state standards. Large
employers and international unions desire absolute uniformity between federal
and state standards. They argue that if a state wishes to administer its own
safety program, it should be able to do so effectively by simply adopting the
federal standards. Employers fear some state standards may be too strict, while
unions fear they may be too weak. If only federal standards exist, an employer
can move men, equipment, and operations from one state to another without
modifying its procedures or retraining its employees. More importantly for the
small operator, analyses of recent federal variances 42 or appeal decisions by
the Review Commission 43 (analyzed in national services and periodicals) will
have considerable influence on state determinations.
Thus far, only four states-California, Michigan, New York, and Washington-have independently created standards. In many instances these state standards are so close to the federal standards that only an expert can detect the
differences. In other cases, such as in California, the state standards are performance oriented, in contrast to the federal specifications. Though the result
42See Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 6(b)(6)(A), 6(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(6)(A), 655(d) (1970).
43 Citations are issued by the Department of Labor for violations of standards or for violations
of section 5(a)(1) of the Act, the general duty clause. Id. § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). These
citations may be appealed to the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
which was established pursuant to section 12. Id. § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 661.

STATE PLANS

may be the same, it takes an engineer to understand the differences and the
similarities for job applications. In Michigan some standards are identical and
some are quite different. When only the state has enforcement jurisdiction,
the significance of such differences diminishes. There will be, however, growing
pressures in the years ahead for national uniformity in standards.
Related to the problem of uniform standards is the question of variances
and appeals decisions. If a national system of uniform standards is established,
then the state variances from those standards and state interpretive decisions
based upon those standards should be reciprocal with the federal determinations.
Perhaps states should simply be bound by federal interpretations of such standards. In any event, pockets of loose enforcement and soft interpretation must
be searched out and eliminated or one state could develop a reputation for
"over-friendliness" to employers in much the same way that Nevada became
a divorce haven and Delaware became a corporation "home office" in past years.
The quality of inspections between the states must also be uniform. States
must abandon their practice of making safety inspectors political appointments.
Federal entrance requirements must be met or exceeded whenever possible,
and inspectors must be trained in a way that will make them true professionals.
Instances of proven bribery or incompetence must be disciplined promptly and
severely. Federal monitoring must be rigid to help assure uniform application.
Finally, there may be a major problem in many states in obtaining passage
of the necessary enabling legislation. Currently, legislation has been defeated,
bottled up in committee, or delayed on the calendar in Missouri, New Jersey,
New York, and a number of other states. 44 Often labor or management attempts
to achieve major variations in state legislation. Unions desire stronger enforcement schemes that those set forth in the federal Act, which is already regarded
as one of the strongest regulatory laws ever conceived concerning employment
conditions. Businessmen attempt to erode employee rights, posting requirements, and the first-instance sanctions, which were devised by Congress to
motivate employers to act before the inspector arrives. Any extreme variations
from the federal law in state legislation will keep the state plan from achieving
OSHA approval. There is a strong possibility that legislation enacted in Virginia
and the District of Columbia may be deemed inadequate.

V
OUTLOOK ON FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

The federal government's request for fiscal year 1975 state plan operational
grants is $46 million for the first 26 state plans it has approved. This is an
increase of over $23 million from the fiscal year 1974 budget. It had not yet
approved funds for 20 other jurisdictions whose plans are pending. It is antidpated that approximately 30 states will be in the approved plan category in
1975 which would result in matching grants of nearly $46 million for the third

year of the program. The inclusion of program grants for large industrial states
44 3 0CC. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 849-50 (1973).
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such as Florida, Massachusetts, and Texas would have an especially dramatic
impact on funding. When all the states' plans that eventually will be approved
are included, nearly $100 million in state matching funds will be supporting
OSHA programs. It is a kind of reverse revenue sharing. Many observers believe
it also demonstrates the degree of commitment by states during a period of
taxpayer revolution and increased demands for other programs, such as environmental protection.
The total federal budget request for the Department of Labor's occupational
safety and health program is approximately $102 million. There have been
some efforts in Congress to reduce this amount or to put more money into
state grants rather than into federal operational programs. However, many members of the Senate will support efforts to increase OSHA enforcement and NIOSH
budgets considerably. The current budget would authorize 920 compliance
officers and industrial hygienists, and it would bring about a projected annual
total of 105,000 inspections. Through the program of grants for the states,
it is estimated that nearly 2,000 more state inspectors will be added if the job
safety and health programs now pending before the Department of Labor are
adopted. 45 Most veteran observers believe that the most that can be expected
in congressional funding under the Act in 1974-75 is the status quo, with some
marginal improvements in the public sector. Such predictions are made on the
basis of testimony before this Congress regarding effects of the Act on farmers
and small employers.
CONCLUSION

Does a tough regulatory piece of legislation like OSHA actually reduce the
number of industrial accidents that occur? The recent report by Mr. Jones
of Ontario46 and the study done by the Wisconsin Department of Labor for
OSHA 47 suggest that the standards and regulations can only reduce or prevent
about half of the industrial accidents that occur. A healthful, sanitary, welllighted, completely protected workplace may still be the locus of many severe
and disabling accidents. Attitudes, behavior patterns, horseplay, preexisting
physical conditions, and employee activities outside the workplace may still be
predominant causal factors in accidents.
While we may not be able to prevent or eliminate all occupational injuries,
deaths, and diseases, active programs can contribute much in an effort to curtail
the unnecessary human suffering and losses caused by workplace accidents.
Successful programs will also decrease the economic costs in lost work time
and workmen's compensation benefits which are a result of occupational injuries
and diseases. In order to acheive such beneficial results a cooperative effort
is essential among employers, employees, and government agencies. Governmental cooperation is essential at all levels, but especially between state and federal
45 See id. at 1131, for reported budget figures.
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governments. Rather than becoming bogged down in intergovernmental bickering, all must concentrate their respective resources on the problem. Ultimately
this is the only way that government can make a significant contribution in
this area, with the greatest success to come from the states' implementation
of the program.

